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The international sugar marketis not a “free” market becauseof extensive use of production
quotas, import controls, government
support prices, and preferential
trade agreements of rich countries.
In the United States, the European
Union, and Japan, protectionist poli-
cies have resulted in domestic prices
up to three times greater than the
world sugar price. In recent years,
the World Trade Organization (WTO),
North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), and regional agree-
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ments have mounted international
pressure to liberalize sugar markets
in the most offending countries but
without much success. Nevertheless,
the major protectionist countries
are becoming aware that current
sugar policies cannot last indefi-
nitely.
The European Union is currently
working toward a more liberal sugar
policy, which is scheduled to be re-
leased later this year. With regional
trade agreements either concluded
or on the horizon, the United States
will also have to address the issue of
sugar reform. Sweetener trade has
been a controversial part of NAFTA.
Mexican sugar exports to the United
States face trade impediments cur-
rently under investigation by a
NAFTA panel; in retaliation, Mexico
has put up discriminatory barriers to
U.S. high fructose corn syrup (HFCS)
exports, an action the WTO is cur-
rently investigating. The current
sweetener disputes between the
United States and Mexico illustrate
the sad state of affairs in sweeteners
markets in several member countries
of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
(OECD); but they also stimulate our
interest in knowing what sugar mar-
kets would look like if they were
completely unfettered.
MODELING SUGAR REFORMS:
EFFECTS ON PRICES, PRODUCTION,
AND TRADE
CARD economists recently analyzed
the impact of the removal of current
market interventions in world sugar
markets. The main scenario consid-
ered removes all trade distortions
*Note: A negative net export value means the country is a net importer.












































   









TABLE 2. IMPACTS OF FULL MARKET LIBERALIZATION ON SUGAR PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
Continued on page 11
(tariffs, export taxes/subsidies, tariff
rate quotas, and state trading) and
all domestic support to producers
and taxes on consumers. In our
model, we implement the reforms in
the 2002/03 trade year and measure
their resulting deviations from the
baseline through 2011/12.
Under the full removal of all
trade and domestic production and
consumption distortions, major
changes occur (see Tables 1 and 2).
Prices increase by 47 percent by the
end of the projection period. Aggre-
gate trade expands moderately, but
the location of production and trade
patterns are substantially affected.
Protectionist OECD countries (the
European Union, Japan, and, to a
lesser extent, Mexico and the United
States) experience an import expan-
sion or export reduction and signifi-
cant contraction in production.
World sugar beet production de-
creases by 21 percent by the end of
the decade, whereas world sugar-
cane production increases by 7 per-
cent. Hence, as conventional
wisdom suggests, cane sugar pro-
duction tends to be more competi-
tive than beet sugar production. The
full set of country-specific results is
available at www.card.iastate.edu in
the paper (“Multilateral Trade and
Agricultural Policy Reforms in Sugar
Markets”). These full results show
that Brazil, Australia, Cuba, Indone-
sia, Malaysia, and Turkey signifi-
cantly expand sugar production
when all distortions are removed.
Aggregate world sugar production
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and use decrease by 3 percent. The
world price increases dramatically, to
47 percent above the baseline level in
2011/12. Production declines signifi-
cantly in the most protected OECD
markets (dropping, on average, 61
percent for the European Union, and
39 percent for Japan). The declines
are smaller for Mexico (8 percent)
and the United States (6 percent).
Production increases in competitive
countries (Brazil, 17 percent; Cuba, 16
percent; Australia, 10 percent). This
result is caused by the high world
price resulting from the removal of
trade and domestic distortions that
affect sugar production. The net in-
centive effect is positive for produc-
ers (a world price increase net of
tariff and subsidy removal).
REFORM EFFECTS ON CONSUMPTION
The changes in consumption are
also pronounced. Countries with
moderate border protection experi-
ence higher consumer prices. For
example, in China, consumption, on
average, decreases by 13 percent. In
countries with high tariffs, the ben-
efits from policy reforms accruing to
domestic consumers are mitigated
by the stronger world price in-
creases. However, since sugar de-
mand tends to be inelastic (that is,
insensitive) to price, these changes
are not dramatic. Sugar consump-
tion increases by 3 percent in the
European Union and by 2 percent in
Japan. U.S. consumption of sugar in-
creases by less than 1 percent.
Consumption distortions exist in
a few countries (Egypt, Cuba, and
Morocco) and their removal has a
negligible impact on world market
prices. In Egypt, consumption de-
creases by 21 percent. In Cuba, be-
cause of the large subsidy removal,
consumption decreases signifi-
cantly, by an average of 42.5 percent
between 2002/03 and 2011/12. Fi-
nally, in Morocco, the removal of the
consumption subsidy results in the
reduction of sugar consumption by
11 percent relative to the baseline.
Despite the stalled WTO agricul-
tural negotiations in the Doha
Round, the U.S. sugar industry is
keen on promoting a multilateral ap-
proach to sugar policy reform and
has vehemently opposed the bilat-
eral negotiations of the current U.S.
administration. The multilateral ne-
gotiation argument has been a con-
venient veil of legitimacy for U.S.
protectionist interests. For example,
the sugar industry fought the U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) on that basis. Nevertheless,
the numbers presented here provide
some credence to the U.S. sugar
industry’s claim about creating a
“world dump price.” It appears that
the competitive segment of the U.S.
sugar industry would survive in un-
fettered markets. A major qualifier is
that the analysis understates exit/
entry and investment decisions in
sugar production. The predicted
drastic increases in the world price
may induce massive investment in
sugar production and reduce these
price changes considerably.
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN
UNFETTERED MARKETS
Despite these limitations, it is clear
that removing all policies would
cause a massive production reloca-
tion away from protected OECD mar-
kets (the European Union, Japan, and,
to a lesser extent, Mexico and the
United States) and toward producers
in competitive countries, chiefly Bra-
zil, Cuba, and Australia.  Hence, there
is a large contingent of foreign sugar
interests demanding open U.S. bor-
ders. Producers in the  European
Union and Japan would be the big-
gest losers under unfettered markets.
The large increase in price is little
solace for their sugar producers, who
would probably be wiped out. Euro-
pean Union producers might want to
focus on quickly negotiating a buy-
out program within the ongoing
Common Agricultural Policy reforms,
while the Doha Round evolves slowly
and the Everything But Arms agree-
ment is not yet fully implemented.
Japanese sugar producers may well
be the last bastion of protectionism
in global sugar markets.
In contrast, sugar interests in
Mexico and the United States would
lose in unfettered markets (free
trade and no domestic subsidies),
but they would survive the global
policy reform. Although at odds
within NAFTA, the two countries
have a common goal in resisting glo-
bal sugar policy reform. This is
ironic since they are implicated in
the undoing of their own protec-
tions because of their NAFTA and
Uruguay Round commitments. The
analysis also makes clear that trade
liberalization without domestic re-
forms would induce import surges in
the United States. These surges
would make domestic programs un-
sustainable because of current
policy commitments. A similar pat-
tern emerges in the European Union,
which would be constrained in its
ability to export expensive domestic
sugar displaced by cheaper imports.
Of course, one should never under-
estimate the strength of the sugar
lobby in OECD countries. The immi-
nent unraveling of sugar protection-
ism has been predicted before, as
shown in the recent outcome of the
U.S.-Australia FTA, which took sugar
off the negotiating table. ◆
